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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
By ARNOLD SHULMAN* AND JOSEPH C. JACKSON**
Unfortunately in writing on the subject of practice and procedure there
is little or no opportunity to indulge in attempts at anticipatory law.
The writers of substantive topics may, on occasion, give a conning tower
view of what should be the law and theorize on the progressive trend in
various fields. However firm the trend may be toward simplification of
practice and procedure, the facts only too well bear out the statement that
pleading is statutory and rule-made law, and leaves to the courts very
little ground for interpretive opinions. Also, all too frequently, the
courts take occasion to use the more or less hidebound tenets of procedure
to avoid a dubious decision on the merits of a case.
It is only common sense to understand that there must be logical regulations under which any action takes place, but such regulations become
untenable when they are the guiding factors under which decisions arise.
This situation is not so much the fault of the judges,' as that of the lawyers
and those who make the law-,a firmly entrenched consciousness of the
past and that anything propositioned upon precedent must be sound. It
will be necessary for even more legislative action to correct this situation,
although our legislatures of the past few years certainly have been heading in the right direction. Such legislative action and a liberal interpretation by the courts, within the bounds of propriety and logic, would go
far toward making the result of a legal action a decision on the merits
of the cause, and not the result of a carefully-played chess game between
lawyers, with the ultimate leaving behind of right and justice.
It is not our attempt to make this article a sounding board for our
views, but the above is written after a time consuming review of the many,
many, cases decided on procedural points during the past year, and the
fact that so often these cases -reiterated basic principles of our adjective
law. Most of these cases are not noted in this article, and only those
decisions which seem interesting, novel, or required some further elaboration are herein mentioned. This survey is not intended as a digest of all
the pleading cases decided during the past year.
The material is set out in appropriate topical headings.
ACTIONS AND

PARTIES

Probably the most far-reaching decision rendered by the appellate
courts of Georgia during the past year was the case of Tucker v.Howard
*Member Atlanta Bar; LL.B., 1936, University of Georgia; Co-author, Georgia
Practice and Procedure, with Wiley H. Davis (The Harrison Company, 1948);
Co-editor, City Code of Atlanta; Annotator, Georgia Code Annotated; Member
Georgia and Atlanta Bar Associations, and Lawyers Club of Atlanta.
**Member LaGrange Bar: Former Associate Editor of The Harrison Company,
Atlanta; LL.B., 1948, Emory University; Co-editor. Georgia Code Annotated;
Co-editor, Encyclopedic Digest of Florida Reports; Member Georgia Bar Association.
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L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc 1 where it was held that the petition of a child,
seeking damages for a prenatal injury resulting from the negligence of the
defendant (in the operation of an ambulance) in carrying its mother to the
hospital, where it was born in slightly more than three hours after the
injury, alleged a cause of action. This question had not been previously
passed upon by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and therefore the decision
was reached by reference to decisions of other jurisdictions, which in themselves, are not unanimous. The Supreme Court, writing through Mr.
Chief Justice Duckworth, rendered an excellent and well-considered opinion which should be read by all lawyers and students of this state. Inasmuch as there was no Georgia decision as precedent, the court stated
that it would reach a decision based upon sound principles and fair deductions from the common law, which is, in such case, of force in this state,
and quoted from Blackstone's Commentaries. "Life is the immediate gift
of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in
contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb ... ."' It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court discarded
Massachusetts and New York rules, which hold that such an action is not
maintainable, and accepted the rulings of the courts of Minnesota and
Ohio, which hold that a child may maintain a suit for damages for prenatal
injuries. The writers are of the opinion that our Supreme Court took the
sensible and just point of view in rendering their opinion.
With reference to changing causes of action or parties, it was held that
the substitution of a personal representative in a pending action has no
effect in changing the cause of action or party plaintiff. This rule is
clearly set out in the case of Chaffin v Chaffin,3 which was an action by a
guardian to cancel a deed executed by the ward after the appointment of
a guardian for his person and property. The ward died pending the action,
and by amendment the administrator of the ward's estate was substituted
as party plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that such substitution did not
introduce a new party plaintiff or change the cause of action.'
The tendency of the law toward a greater survival of actions continues
to be slow, especially in regard to tort actions and injuries to realty. The
reason for this, of course, is that our legislature has not seen fit to enact
appropriate survival statutes. However, in Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.'
a cause of action for damage to personal property was allowed to survive.
It was pointed out in that case that prior to the enactment of the statute
of 4 Edward III, c. 7, no cause of action in tort survived to the personal
representative of the deceased. This statute, which was enacted in the fourteenth century, became a part of the common law of Georgia on May 14,
1. 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951). Maryland's Court of Appeals recently held
that a child, suffering prenatal injuries inflicted through the negligence of others,
could maintain an action for such injuries. Thus, Maryland may be added to the
list of states in which such action will lie. See Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d
550 (Md. 1951).
2. 208 Ga. at 203, 65 S.E.2d at 910.
3. 207 Ga. 36, 59 S.E.2d 911 (1950). See also, Chaffin v. Chaffin, 205 Ga. 344, 53
S.E.2d 367 (1949).
4. See GA. CODE §§ 3-404, 3-501 (1933).
5. 82 Ga. App. 460, 61 S.E.2d 510 (1950).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 3

1776,' and by virtue thereof, causes of action for damage to personal property survive to the personal representative of the deceased injured party
although no action is pending at the time of the death. Georgia has no
provision of law for the survival of actions for damage to real property
where at death no suit has been filed and there has been no express assignment of the cause of action. Under English law, however, actions for
damages in favor of executors of the testator who suffered the injury,
survive by virtue of the statutes of William IV. Since these statutes were
not enacted until 1833, they did not become a part of the common law
of Georgia. Medical and funeral expenses also may not be recovered by
a testator's personal representative, there being no provision of law for
the survival of such an action.7
Under the Code,' a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly
or indirectly, a right of property; but a right of action for personal torts
or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned.
However, where the right of action does involve, directly or indirectly,
a right of property, it is assignable, and the assignee must bring suit in his
own name without joining the assignor, which is the same rule that obtains
in regard to choses in action ex contractu.' Under the above principles of
law, the plaintiff in Browder v. Cox" was not allowed to prevail in an
action in trover, brought for the benefit of his insurer, to recover for the
value and hire of an automobile wrongfully taken from him, after having
been resold several times, came into the possession of the defendant. The
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff having transferred to his insurer,
under the terms of the insurance policy, all of his right, title and interest
in the automobile sought to be recovered, and having assigned all claims
or demands which he might have at law and in equity because of the loss
thereof and the damage resulting therefrom, he could not maintain an
action either for his own use or for the use of anyone else to recover the
automobile or its value.
That in every suit there must be a real plaintiff and a real defendant
was again reiterated by the Supreme Court." No suit can be lawfully
prosecuted save in the name of a plaintiff having a legal entity. The
plaintiff or defendant may be a natural or an artificial person, or a quasiartificial person, such as a partnership. If a suit is brought in a name
which is neither that of a natural person, nor a corporation, nor a partnership, it is a mere nullity. In the instant case," the plaintiffs being unincorporated Odd Fellows Lodges, the suit was not brought in the name
of a natural person, corporation, or partnership, and therefore was a
mere nullity.
The Court of Appeals upheld the allowance of an amendment to a declaration in attachment brought avainst a defendant in a trade name in
regard to the correct name in which the defendant must be sued." The
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
12.
11.
13.

Harris v. Powers. 129 Ga. 74, 58 S.E. 1038 (1907).
82 Ga. App. at 466, 61 S.E.2d at 515.
GA. CODE § 85-1805 (1933).
Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, 99 S.E. 533 (1919).
83 Ga. App. 738, 64 S.E.2d 460 (1951).
Ibid.
Myrtle Lodre No. 1663 v. Quattlebaum, 207 Ga. 575,63 S.E.2d 365 (1951).
Martin v. Waltman, 82 Ga. App. 375, 61 S.E.2d 214 (1950).
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defendant named therein being Ed Martin Sea Food Company, the plaintiff was permitted to insert the name of the individual doing business
under such a trade name so that the name of the defendant could be
properly shown in the declaration as "Ed Martin, doing business as Ed
Martin Sea Food Company." The court held that such an amendment did
not involve the substitution of a new and distinct party, but merely served
to identify the intended defendant as an individual doing business
under a trade name.
A personal representative may not sue himself in his representative
capacity. This was held in W7heeler v. Wheeler,4 which was an action by
a mother against her son for injuries sustained in an 'utomobile accident.
Pending the suit the mother died. The son was appointed co-executor
under her will, and by amendment had himself and the other co-executor
made parties plaintiff to the action. This resulted in the son suing himself in his representative capacity. The court later, however, by amendment
and order, struck the son as party plaintiff, and allowed the suit to
proceed when the son properly renounced his trust. The court's ruling was
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
An example of a nonresident defendant waiving jurisdiction after such
jurisdiction was lost by the court was brought out in the case of Burger v.
Noble.15 In that case a nonresident and a resident were joined as defendants in an action at law. A verdict was rendered against the nonresident but in favor of the resident. In such an instance the court lost
jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant, 1', and a motion in arrest of judgment was tile proper remedy where jurisdiction had been lost, and not
waived.'7 But, however, where such nonresident defendant moved for a
new trial, this constituted such an attack on the merits as to waive the
question of jurisdiction of the court over the nonresident. 8
An interesting case regarding the election of remedies decided during
the period of this survev is Thonias v. Loinax.9 The plaintiff sued the
defendant in contract. The court not being able to determine from the
petition whether the plaintiff was seeking damages for the breach of an
express or imolied contract, questioned the counsel for the plaintiff as to
his election. The counsel stated to the court that the case was one for
breach of an express contract, and the case was tried on that theory. The
plaintiff having elected his remedy could not recover upon proof of the
breach of an implied contract. It seems, judging from this case, that in
an action where the plaintiff has a choice of remedies and it is impossible
to determine from his petition what course he has selected, the court
may require the plaintiff to make an oral election, the defendant having
failed to take advantage of the vague, indefinite and duplicitous petition
by demurrer. At least, it is an innovation of such.
14. 82 Ga. App. 831, 62 S.E.2d 579 (1950).
15. 81 Ga. App. 759, 59 S.E.2d 761 (1950).
16. See Warren v. Rushing. 144 Ga 612. 87 S.E. 775 (1916)
v. Brown, 113 Ga. 414. 38 S.E. 989 (1901).
17. Christian v. Terry, 36 Ga. App. 815. 138 S.E. 244 '(1927).
18. Butler v. Winton, 56 Ga. Ann. 443. 192 S.E. 835 (1937).
19. 82 Ga. App. 592, 61 S.E.2d 790 (1950).

Central of Ga. Ry. Co.,
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PETITIONS AND AMENDMENTS THERETO

With reference to the preparation of the petition, no startling developments took place within the period covered by this survey. There were
many cases reiterating basic precepts of the law which the writers did
not deem sufficiently important to be worthy of separate mention. However, a few cases deserve noting.
It is not required that a petition be an exhaustive statement of the
exact evidence upon which the party will rely in the establishment of his
contentions. On the contrary, so far as matters of inducement and other
minor matters are concerned, a clear brief statement of immaterial
matters (the briefer the better) is to be commended."0
The courts, however, still insist that a petition set forth a positive
statement of fact upon which the action is to be based, and will not permit any discrepancies in the allegations. Where, for instance, as in the
case of Robertson v. Nat Kaiser Investment Co.,2 a petition in an action
for personal injuries caused by a defective grating was phrased in the
disjunctive, stating that, "The grating was constructed by or at the direction of, or for the benefit of the defendant

.

. .

,"

this, when construed

most strongly against the petitioner, amounts only to a declaration that
the construction was for the benefit of the defendant, and the petition
was held subject to a general demurrer.
Continuing on the subject of definiteness in petitions, the Courts of Appeals held in the case of SeaboardAir Line R. Co. v. Stoddrad," that where
in an action for wrongful death, the petition stated, first, that the
petitioner could not show how the death occurred, but in another paragraph
set out three separate and inconsistent ways in which it did occur, the
petition was subject to a special demurrer.
The statutory or "Jack Jones" forms for petitions were again upheld
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Graham v. Raines,2 3 wherein it was
held that a petition in a trover action drawn substantially in the "Jack
Jones" form was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.
It has long been a recognized rule of law that the plaintiff may strike
his entire petition and substitute therefor an amended petition, and where
this is done, the procedure is not subject to demurrer on the ground that the
petition having been stricken, there is nothing to amend by. Of course,
care must be taken to insure that the cause of action is not changed, that
no additional parties are added, and that none of the rules relating to
amendments to petitions generally, are violated. This rule was clearly set
out in the case of Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Sharpe, 4 where an amended
petition was offered which amounted to nothing more than the addition
of a second count.
In addition to the voluntary amendments which we have been discussing, we also have what might be termed a compulsory amendment, that
is to say, an amendment proffered in response to a court's ruling on special
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

American Thread Co. v. Rochester. 82 Ga. App. 873, 62 S.E.2d 602 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 416, 61 S.E.2d 298 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 743, 62 S.E.2d 620 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 581, 64 S.E.2d 98 (1951).
83 Ga. App. 12, 62 S.E.2d 427 (1950).
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demurrrer, which would result in the dismissal of the case or a striking
of a substantial part thereof, if such an amendment were not forthcoming.
In such cases, it is essential that the amendment meet the ruling of the
demurrer as to the sufficiency of the petition, and that it be filed within
the time stipulated by the court. This was clearly illustrated in the case of
Taylor v. Cook, 5 in which case a special demurrer was sustained on June
13, 1949, and the petitioner was ordered to amend within twenty days.

The petitioner did nothing within this twenty-day period, either by way
of amendment or by preserving his exceptions. He did, however, on
January i6, i95o, offer an amendment based upon the ruling on demurrer.
It was held that this offer of amendment not being within the time allowed,
was wholly ineffectual and void, and that the rulings upon the demurrer
having become the law of the case, all portions of the petition as demurred
to were lost.

In ordering petitioners to amend after hearings upon special demurrers,
the court will be guided by the principles of substantial justice and reasonableness, and will not require an impossible amendment. In the case of
Tyler v. Eubanks," where it was made to appear to the trial judge by
amendments offered by the plaintiff in compliance with a judgment on
demurrer during the same term, that the original judgment had erroneously
required of the plaintiff an impossible amendment, it was not an abuse
of discretion on the part of such trial judge to overrule his former judgment, and in order to promote justice, to overrule the objections to the
amendments offered and the motions to dismiss the entire petition. The
judge then properly overruled the original demurrer to the petition and
held it to state a good cause of action.
PROCESS AND

SERVICE

Very few cases involving process and service of process came before
our appellate courts in the time covered by this survey. However, three
cases seem worthy of mentioning.
A trial judge has the power and authority on his own motion to order
the clerk of the court to attach to the plaintiff's petition a process conformable to law. 2' This rule is clearly illustrated by the case of Banister v.
Hubbard.- In that case the clerk attached to the plaintiff's petition for
damages a process requiring the defendants to be and appear at the next
term of court and answer the plaintiff's suit. Such a process was issued in
accordance with the requirments of Code Section 81-201 prior to the
1946 amendment.2 The court, on its own motion, ordered and directed
the clerk to attach to the plaintiff's petition a new process in conformity
with the present requirments of the Code." The Court of Appeals held
that this was proper.
25. 207 Ga. 723, 64 S.E.2d 72 (1951).
26. 207 Ga. 46.60 S.E.2d 130 (1950).
27. See GA. CODE § 24-104 (6) (1933), as to the power of the court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
28. 82 Ga. App. 813, 62 S.E.2d 761 (1950).
29. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 761, 768. Prior to this amendment the defendant was required
to answer at the next term; the defendant must now answer within thirty days after
the service of the petition and process. See GA. CODE ANN. § 81-201 (Supp. 1947).
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 81-201 (Supp. 1947).
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The case of Malcom v. Knox". involved the question of whether the
prayer for process in the plaintiff's petition was sufficient as a matter
of law to require the clerk to issue process. The prayer for process was
as follows: "That process may issue requiring the said defendant to be
and appear at the next term of this honorable court to answer your petitioner's complaint." The Court of Appeals held that even though the
prayer for process was defective, the record clearly disclosed that the
defendant had actual knowledge that the suit was pending against him, and
that the process was therefore properly issued; also that "next term"
in the prayer could be construed as the next legal term of the court.
In a divorce action, failure to perfect service of process by publication
on a nonresident defendant renders the decree for divorce void for want
of jurisdiction over the defendant."
No case, at the present time, has been decided involving service upon
nonresident and unauthorized insurance companies as provided by the
"Unauthorized Insurers Act," enacted by the i95o session of the legislature. 3
DEFENSIVE PLEADINGS

The cases covered in the next several paragraphs deal primarily with
demurrers, answers and special pleas. No cases of importance were
decided during the period of this survey in regard to the Statute of
Frauds, recoupment or res judicata. Quite naturally a great many cases
were decided on demurred. A few of these have been chosen that seem
worthy of comment.
Definiteness in setting out a cause of action is one of the primary requirements to be exercised to prevent the petition from being subject to a
demurrer. Indefiniteness in pleading should, as a rule, be raised by special
demurrer; yet a petition which is too vague and indefinite to support a
recovery may properly be dismissed on general demurrer. In O'Hara v.
Youmans,3" a petition in trover which set out the description of the property, its value, title in the plaintiff, possession in the defendant, and a
refusal of the defendant to deliver on demand, was of sufficient definiteness
to withstand a general demurrer. However, in an action on a contract,
the Court of Appeals in 4llison v..Allman,3" held that the allegations of
the petition were so vague, uncertain, indefinite, and contradictory, that
it was impossible to understand upon what theory the plaintiff sought a
recovery, and that under such circumstances the petition failed to state a
cause of action.
An action by an invitee for personal injuries was properly dismissed on
general demurrer in failing to show an invitation to the part of the defendant's premises where the injury occurred, since one may be an invitee
31. 81 Ga. App. 579, 59 S.E.2d 542 (1950).
32. Lott v. Lott, 207 Ga. 34, 59 S.E.2d 912 (1950).
GA. CODE ANN., § 81-206 (Supp. 1947).
33. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 58.
34. 82 Ga. App. 164, 60 S.E.2d 841 (1950).
35. 82 Ga. App. 574, 61 S.E.2d 672 (1950).

See GA. CODE § 110-709 (1933);
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as to one portion of premises, but a mere licensee or trespasser as to
other portions."
The Supreme Court, in the case of Maggi v. Sylvan Circle Apartments,
Inc. :" reiterated the well-settled principle of law that a general demurrer will
lie to a bill in equity where there is an adequate remedy at law.
A special demurrer, being a critic, must itself be free from fault. The
Court of Appeals again applied this rule in sustaining the overruling of a
special demurrer, which merely recited that a paragraph to the petition
was vague, indefinite and uncertain. Such a demurrer is itself vague, indefinite, uncertain and is bad.:"
Duplicitous allegations in petitions warrant the use and sustaining of a
special demurrer. Examples of this are the cases of Salmon Butane Gas &
Appliance Co. v. [Jalraven" and City of Atlanta v. Alinder." In the
Salmon case it was held that where a petition, as amended, sought recovery for damages to plaintiff's property because of improper installation of a water heater, also for breach of warranty as to such heater, the
petition was duplicitous, and subject to special demurrer. In City of Atlanta v. Minder, the petition was subject to special demurrer for duplicity
where such petition alleged that the defendant dumped trash on plaintiff's
land, such dumping constituting the taking of private property without justcompensation, and also with creating a nuisance.
Where special demurrers are sustained to a petition, and the plaintiff submits to such ruling by the trial judge by amending to meet the
special demurrers, the plaintiff cannot then insist upon the assignment of
error on 41the exceptions pendente lite to the sustaining of the special demurrers.

A general demurrer was sustained to an action on an accident insurance
policy for failure to allege that the death was by accident or accidental
means.4 2 The Court of Appeals held that in an action on such a policy, the
petition must allege death, not only from violent and external means, but
it must allege that it resulted from accidental means as well.
In raising the defense of the statute of limitations, one means is by
special plea. However, where on the face of the pleadings it is shown that
the suit is barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant should take
advantage of the statue by general demurrer. The demurrer should not
merely state that no cause of action is set out, but it should specifically
set forth that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. An instance of the use of a general demurrer in asserting that an action is
barred by the statute of limitations is the case of Odom v. Atlanta & W. P.
R. Co.43 In that case a husband and father was killed by a train and
the widow made a settlement for the wrongful death. Subsequently the
children, asserting that the settlement was fraudulent, and that the
widow refused to enter a suit to cancel the settlement and recover for
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
,43.

Piggly Wiggly v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526, 64 S.E.2d 201 (1951).
207 Ga. 580, 63 S.E.2d 368 (1951).
Rhyne v. Price, 82 Ga. App. 691, 62 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 799, 62 S.E.2d 418 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 295, 63 S.E.2d 420 (1951).
Hobbs v. Starr, 82 Ga. App. 441, 61 S.E.2d 435 (1950).
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571, 61 S.E.2d 579 (1950).
208 Ga. 45, 64 S.E.2d 889 (1951).
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the value of the life of the deceased, sought an order of court authorizing
the use of the widow's name in the proposed suit. The Supreme Court
held that since the proposed suit showed by its allegations that it was
barred by the statute of limitations, it was subject to demurrer on that
ground.
Where special and general demurrers are sustained, and the petition
is'dismissed, the plaintiff must be careful to except to the sustaining of
both the special and general demurrers. This point is well illustrated by
the case of Cromer v. Dinkier.4 In that case the trial judge sustained
general and special demurrers to the petition for damages as amended.
The plaintiff excepted only to the sustaining of the general demurrer and
the dismissal of the petition. The Court of Appeals held that under such
circumstances the rulings on the special demurrer became the law of the
case, right or wrong, and in considering the assignment of error on the
sustaining of the general demurrer, the court could view the petition only
after the parts so attacked by the special demurrers have been eliminated,
and, when so considered, the petition failed to state a cause of action and
was subject to the general demurrer.
In regard to demurrers to defensive pleadings, it was held in Mayo v.
Owen" that where a demurrer to an answer was not filed within fifteen
days after the defensive pleadings, but no motion was made for its dismissal, and a hearing was had as to the merits of the suit, judgment
,overruling the well-taken demurrer must be reversed, since such judgment was not tantamount to a dismissal.
In 4tlanta Paper Co. v. Signion," the Court of Appeals again upheld
the rule that where a demurrer, filed after a material amendment, does not
in terms renew the original demurrer filed prior to the amendment, no
question as to the original demurrer being presented, the case must be
decided without regard to the original demurrer.
A demurrer will be sustained to an amendment to an answer filed after
the time to file an answer has expired,4" which does not have attached
thereto an affidavit to the effect that it is not filed for the purpose of delay."
Several cases involving cross-actions decided during the time covered
bv this survey are of ample importance to mention. In Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Mouldcr4" the plaintiff sought a recovery on account for
materials purchased by the defendant. The defendant answered and set
up that he had paid the account sued on, and by way of cross-action alleged that the plaintiff was indebted to him in a certain amount upon an oral
contract for the value of services rendered by him to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff demurred to the defendant's answer on the ground that the
"answer of the defendant in the nature of a cross-action seeks to introduce
new and distinct matter not germane to the original suit." The Court of
Appeals, in sustaining the trial court in overruling plaintiff's demurrer
to defendant's cross-action, held that the claim by the defendant for the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48
49.

82 Ga. App. 227.60 S.E.2d 482 (1950).
207 Ga. 641, 63 S.E.2d 649 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 730, 62 S.E.2d 363 (1950).
See GA. CODE ANN., § 81-201 (Sunop. 1947).
Walker v. McMillen, 83 Ga. App. 257, 63 S.E.2d 250 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 148, 60 S.E.2d 647 (1950).
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value of services rendered by him to the plaintiff under the oral contract
or agreement could be set up in the defendant's answer to the action by
the plaintiff for the value of materials sold by it to the defendant. That
the cross-action did not introduce new and distinct matter not germane
to the original suit. The court pointed out that under the Code," "all claims
arising ex contractu between the same parties may be joined in the same
action .

.

." In this case both claims arose ex contractu and were of the

same nature.
The defendant, a cotton warehouseman, in an action in trover brought
to recover certain cotton stored with him, could not plead by way of set
off any claim for charges which he might have against the plaintiff for
other cotton which had been stored in his warehouse by the plaintiff and
which the defendant had permitted the plaintiff to withdraw without
insisting upon his lien for storage charges upon the express promise of
the plaintiff to pay. The Court of Appeals held that such a plea was subject to demurrer as attempting to join a claim ex contractu to an action ex
delicto. No insolvency or non-residence of the plaintiff appeared and there
being no other facts alleged sufficient to authorize a court of equity to
take jurisdiction.
It was held in 4lpharetta Feed & Poultry Co. v. Cocke,M that where
a defendant was sued upon a debt evidenced by a check given in payment
thereof, it was competent for the defendant, by cross-action, to set up the
contract under the terms of which the debt was incurred. That the defendant could recoup damages regardless of whether or not they exceeded the
amount the plaintiff incurred by a breach of another obligation of the contract by the plaintiff. The defendant in seeking such affirmative relief by
way of cross-action, must allege the damages suffered with the same
particularity as though he were bringing the suit in the first instance. Otherwise, the plea is subject to special demurrer for indefiniteness in setting out
damages.
In pointing out the difference between recoupment and set-off, the Court
of Appeals, in Byroin v. Rinqge" held that the plea of recoupment is applicable where the parties rely on the same contract; and that the plea
of set-off is applicable where different contracts are relied upon. Where,
therefore, the defendant attempts to set off matter of an affirmative nature
which would entitle him to damages against the plaintiff, but which does
not arise out of the mutual contract sued upon, the statute of limitations
is applicable, the plea being one of set-off.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Code Section 22-I 104, relating to service by publication upon non-resident corporations, was held unconstitutional in 1939 by the decision in
Piggly Wiggly Ga. Co. v. May Investing Corp.," such decision holding that
the Code Section involved was violative of the due process clauses con50. GA. CODE§3-113 (1933).
51. Mercer v. Shiver, 81 Ga. App. 815, 60 S.E.2d 263 (1950).
52. 82 Ga. App. 718, 62 S.E.2d 642 (1950).
53. 83 Ga. App. 234, 63 S.E.2d 235 (1951).
54. 189 Ga. 477,6 S.E.2d 579 (1939).
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tained in both the Federal and State Constitutions. In 1951 the legislature
repealed such Code Section in its entirety. '5
The question of whether a petition showing an actual controversy and
praying for a declaratory judgment adjudicating title to realty so as to
confer venue on the superior court of the county where the land was
situated, was raised in the case of Shaw v. Crawford." In that case the
allegations of the petition clearly showed a controversy in which the petitioner and one of the defendants were claiming title to the realty under
separate chains of title, coupled with the prayer for a declaratory judgment adjudicating the title to the property to be in the petitioner. This was
held to be sufficient to constitute an action respecting title to land under the
Constitution of 1945,' 7 and the petition was properly brought in the county
where the land was situated.
An interesting and rather novel question arose in the case of Breen v.
Barfield,"S where an action for bail trover for the possession of a deed to
realty was brought in the Civil Court of Fulton County. In that case the
evidence conclusively showed that the sole purpose of the action was to
test the issue of whether or not the deed had been delivered so as to
effectively pass the title to the realty. The Court of Appeals held that the
action was actually involving the title to realty of which the superior
court has exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly the Civil Court of Fulton
County was without jurisdiction. It can be seen from this decision that
the Court of Appeals went beyond the mere nomenclature of the action
a'nd arrived at the actual purpose of the cause, and rightly determined
that the case tested the delivery of the deed and therefore clearly involved the title to the land described.
In the case of Burger v. Noble,5 the question of waiver of want of
jurisdiction arose where a non-resident defendant who was one of two joint
defendants who were sued in the county of the residence of one of them,
and the judgment was in favor of such resident defendant, the court would
have lost jurisdiction as to the non-resident codefendant unless jurisdiction
was waived, either expressly or impliedly by the conduct of the non-resident defendant. However, where the non-resident defendant subsequently
invoked a ruling of the court on the merits of the case, want of jurisdiction
of the person was waived and jurisdiction was admitted. It was held
in that case that a ruling by the trial court on a motion for a new trial
made by such non-resident defendantwas such a ruling, on tile merits.
Further on the subiect of the Jurisdiction of a court on a non-resident
defendant, the case of Briqys v.Briqqs" brought forward the question of
whether or not in an equitable proceeding seeking to modify a decree
awarding the custody of children, tile forwarding by registered mail of
a copy of the petition and cx parle order subjected the non-resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. It was held that it did not. The decision
was based on the fact that the authority of a court to issue and serve process
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Ga. Laws 1951, p. 16.
207 Ga. 67, 60 S.E.2d 143 (1950).
Art. VI, § 14 1 2, GA. COD, ANN. § 2-4902 (1948 Rev.).
82 Ga. App. 204, 60 S.E.2d 513 (1950).
See note 15 supra.
207 Ga. 614, 63 S.E.2d 371 (1951).
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is restricted to the territory of the state where issued, and the court has
no power to require persons not within such territory to appear.
It was held in the case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Davis,"
that where a non-resident plaintiff brings an action ex contractu in a court
of law, which has no authority to entertain an equitable defense, or to
make another party to the suit, or to allow a set-off arising ex delicto, a
court of equity in the county where the suit is pending, may, on petition of
the defendant in the pending suit, enjoin the action at law in order to
allow such defendant to set up and have adjudicated in the equity case, as
to the non-resident plaintiff, all matters incidental to such litigation.
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES

Several cases involving the extraordinary legal remedies of mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus are of ample importance to warrant dis,cussing here.
A petition for the writ of mandamus must show that the applicant has
a clear legal right to have performed the particular act which he seeks
to have enforced; and that it is the defendant's legal duty, as a public
.officer, to perform it. 2 Applying this rule, the Supreme Court in Trussell
v. Martin" " held that the petition in an action by a school bus driver against
a county school superintendent and county board of education to compel
payment of wages due in failing to show a clear duty on the part of the
officers to make such payment, failed to state a cause of action for the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus, and was subject to a general demurrer.
In Richardson v. Passmore" the petitioner brought a mandamus proceeding to compel the clerk of the Council of the City of Atlanta to issue
a license for the operation of a rooming house in an area zoned for
dwelling houses only. In allowing the writ of mandamus, it was pointed
out that under the City Code of Atlanta"5 a dwelling or apartment occupied
as a private residence, one or more rooms may be rented or tableboard
furnished; and that, as a general rule, the owner of land in fee has the
right to use the property for any lawful purpose, and any claim that there
are restrictions upon such use must be clearly established. That limitations
,or restrictions by implication are not favored, and must be strictly construed, and such rule applies with equal force whether the restrictions by
implication are based upon a restrictive covenant in a deed or upon a
zoning ordinance. Applying the above rules, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant clerk failed to establish valid restrictions on the use of
private property under the zoning regulations, and that under such circumstances mandamus would lie to compel the issuance of a license to
the plaintiff for the operation of a tourist home.
It was held in Lankford v. Kirkland 6 that a writ. of mandamus is not
an available remedy to compel the discharge of a duty of a commissioner
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

207 Ga.
See GA.
207 Ga.
207 Ga.
Section
207 Ga.

562, 63
CODE §
553, 63
572, 63
93-206
504, 62

S.E.2d
64-101
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
(1942).
S.E.2d

353 (1951).
(1933).
361 (1951).
392 (1951).
836 (1951).
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appointed by the court to partition lands since such duties are purely administrative, and to issue a mandamus to compel the commissioner to act would
be the equivalent of the court ordering itself to act. It was pointed out
that failure of the commissioner to act might be grounds for contempt
proceedings but not for mandamus.
A writ of mandamus was allowed in McLendon v 4nderson, 7 directing
and requiring the trial judge to issue an order superseding a judgment
in a criminal case involving capital punishment. The trial judge certified
the bill of exceptions but refused to supersede the judgment. Since the
execution would have taken place before the matter would have reached
the Supreme Court, it was held that it was mandatory on the part of the
judge to supersede the judgment, and that mandamus would lie to compel
such grant.
In regard to setting aside a writ of mandamus absolute, it was held in,
Hunter v. Gillcspic that where the defendant failed to appear and defend a mandamus proceeding because of the fraud of plaintiff's counsel,
a trial court which has plenary power over its decisions rendered in the
same term of court, could set aside the mandamus entered upon default.
Mandamus by the Board of Commissioners of the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund of Georgia would lie to compel the clerk of a
recorder's court of a city to pay over to them the sums retained by him
and due under the provisions of the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit
Fund Act."0
Two cases involving quo warranto proceedings seem of sufficient importance to note.
In the first, Robert v. Steed,7 a quo warranto proceeding was sued successfully in ousting the defendant from the office of County Surveyor of
Fulton County for failing to file the required official bond in the prescribed
time after having been elected to the office of county surveyor.

In the second, Colicr v. A'itchell,71 it was held that in a quo warranto.

proceeding to inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the office of
the Judge of the Civil Court of DeKalb County, the allegation in plaintiff's
petition that the defendant was not a resident of the City of Atlanta and'
therefore not eligible for the office of judge of such court, was sufficient to
set out a cause of action and was good against a general demurrer.
Most of the rules of law in regard to habeas corpus cases contained in
the opinions handed down by the Supreme Court during the period of
time covered by this survey are in most instances merely reiterations of
long established principles. A few of the cases are here mentioned.
In the case of Solesbcc v. Balkcom, " the Superme Court held that where
67. 207 Ga. 243, 60 S.E.2d 762 (1950).
68. 207 Ga. 574, 63 S.E.2d 404 (1951).
69. Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950). The Peace Officers' Annuity and
Benefit Fund Act was passed by the General Assembly in 1950 (Ga. Laws 1950,

p. 50). Section 10 of the act requires that in all fines collected in an amount of
$5.00 or more, $1.00 shall be paid into the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit
Fund of Georgia. In the case under discussion the Clerk of the Recorder's Court

of the City of East Point refused to pay over the sums collected from fines, claiming the act to be unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the act was upheld.
70.
71.
72.

207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950).
207 Ga. 528, 63 S.E.2d 338 (1951).
207 Ga. 352, 61 S.E.2d 471 (1950).
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a habeas corpus action is brought by a prisoner on the ground that he was
not present at the time of resentencing, the burden of proof is upon such
prisoner to show improper procedure, if any, and that a mere reading of
the petition is not sufficient.
Affirming the trial court in denying the release of the applicant on a
writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held in the case of McLendon v.
Balkcom,7" that a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after conviction,
could not be granted unless the judgment was absolutely void; and that
such writ could never be used as a substitute for a writ of error, or other
remedial procedure to correct errors in the trial of a criminal case. Likewisewhere, upon revocation of probation, probationer is entitled to notice
of the revocation and a hearing, and failure to allow him to testify, introduce witnesses and cross-examine witnesses against him is error; however, such error does not render such hearing a nullity so as to allow
probationer to maintain habeas corpus proceedings."
The Supreme Court, in the case of Reid v. Perkerson,75 upheld the rule
that on the hearing of an application for habeas corpus, the only question
to be determined by the court is the legality of the detention That where
the application affirmatively shows on its face that the restraint is legal,
the judge to whom the writ is returned has the power, on general demurrer,
to dismiss the writ and remand the prisoner.
It was held in the case of Patterson v. Balkcom,7 that a complaint that
colored persons were systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the
jury list in the county in which the applicant, a person of color, was convicted, does not present a good ground for habeas corpus for the reason
that an objection of this kind should have been presented in a proper way
at the trial, and upon failure to do so it is to be considered as waived.
In regard to seeking custody of children by habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court in Burton v. Furcron" held that where in a divorce decree an award
of custody of children was made "for the present," and stated that the
court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of determining permanent custody
of the children, such will not divest the award of its finality, nor retain
exclusive jurisdiction over their custody where a change of condition
affecting their welfare occurs, so as to prevent a court of another county
from acquiring jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding custody of the
children to another.
A father, in the case of McClain v. Smith,"5 was denied custody as
against the mother of their two minor children in a habeas corpus proceeding for their custody brought by the father. The right to parental
73. 207 Ga. 100, 60 S.E.2d 753 (1950).
74. Moye v. Futch, 207 Ga. 52. 60 S.E.2d 137 (1950). See also, Lester v. Foster, 207
Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951), wherein the trial court was reversed for failure
to give probationer notice and a hearing prior to the revocation of his probation.
This decision overruled the case of Mincey v. Crow, 198 Ga. 245, 31 S.E.2d 406
(1944), which held that a suspended sentence could be revoked with or without
cause, and in the absence of the accused.
75. 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).
76. 207 Ga. 511, 63 S.E.2d 325 (1951).
77. 207 Ga. 637, 63 S.E.2d 650 (1951).
78. 207 Ga. 641, 63 S.E.2d 663 (1951).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

control was lost by the father by his failure to provide necessaries for the
children. 7 '
Another case involving custody of children in a habeas corpus proceeding is that of Everett v. Sharpe." It was held in that case that where there
are issues of fact in a habeas corpus case involving the custody of children,
it is erroneous for the trial judge to base his judgment upon documents
which were excluded and not a part of the record in the case.
EXTRAORDINARY EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Equity will in no case grant an injunction for the sole purpose of
requiring one to perform an act such as the removal of an obstruction
in an alley or road in violation of the Code, 8 and while there are available
adequate remedies at law; but where there are other grounds for equity
jurisdiction, such as the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, equity will
exercise jurisdiction and grant full relief even though obedience to the
injunction might require the performance of an act such as the removal
of an obstruction. Applying the above rule, the Supreme Court in the
2 held that where the only relief sought was
case of Haney v. Sheppard"
an injunction against the obstruction of an alley after such obstruction had
been placed therein, the petition was subject to demurrer in that there
was an available remedy at law and a mandatory injunction for the removal
of the obstruction should not have been granted. It was further held that
the allegation of the existence of three separate obstructions to the same
alley was not sufficient to authorize equity to assume jurisdiction for the
purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.
Another instance where injunctive relief was denied because of the
existence of an adequate and complete remedy at law is in the case of
Chadwick '. Dolinoff." In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the dedefendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, from operating a competitive business in accordance with the terms of a contract entered into
between the plaintiff and the defendant while the relationship of employeremployee existed. By the terms of the contract it was agreed that the
defendant would not, directly or indirectly, during the term of his employment and for five years next thereafter engage in a competitive business
with that of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that from the allegations of the petition the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law; and in
the absence of such indispensable averments as the insolvency of the defendant and that plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury from defendant's
violation of the contract, the petition failed to State a proper cause for
the extraordinary equitable remedy of injunction.
Criminal prosecutions, as a general rule, will not be enjoined by courts
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

See CA.

CODE . 74-108 (3) (1933).
207 Ga. 502, 63 S.E.2d 1 (1951).
GA. CODE § 55-110 (1933).
207 Ga. 158, 60 S.E.2d 453 (1950). In Head v. Crouch, 207 Ga. 648, 63 S.E.2d 647
(1951), injunctive relief was denied petitioners for the removal of obstructions
from a street, irrespective of any legal rights, where the petitioners knew that
the obstructions were being built and failed to use diligence in stopping the erection of the obstructions.
207 Ga. 702, 64 S.E.2d 76 (1951).
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exercising equity jurisdiction. This established rule was again followed by
the Supreme Court in the case of City of Bainbridgev. Olan Mills. 4 In that
case the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily instructed and directed its
employees to deliberately violate a city ordinance in order that an employee would be arrested so that the plaintiff would have grounds to enjoin prosecutions of its employees under the ordinance and to test its
validity. In denying the injunctive relief, the Supreme Court held that:
equity was not a special or favored forum for determining the validity of
municipal ordinances. That only under exceptional facts and circumstances
would equity powers be used to restrain criminal prosecutions, even
though their defense may be burdensome and attended by inconvenience.
The fact that the prosecutions were based on an invalid ordinance, and
that repeated arrests and prosecutions might continue to be instituted
thereunder, would not, in the absence of other circumstances, justify intervention of a court of equity changing the general rule. The plaintiff having deliberately involved itself in such a predicament could not then invoke
the aid of equity to extricate itself thereform. It was pointed out that the.
validity of he ordinance could be tested by the defense of the criminal
prosecutions in the courts; having jurisdiction over criminal matters, but
that the court of equity would not invade the domain of such courts to
test the validity of a criminal ordinance.
A case which is interesting from the point of view of injunctions and the
5 The
appointment of a receiver is that of Oattis v. West View Corp."
court in that case held that the power of appointing receivers should be
prudently and cautiously exerised, and except in clear and urgent cases
should not be resorted to.86 Creditors without lien may not, as a general
rule, enjoin their debtors from disposing of property, nor obtain injunction or extraordinary relief in equity." The court, although holding that
the allegations in the Oattis case did not set forth extraordinary circumstances as would take the case out of the general rule, did reiterate the
well-established proposition that there are exceptions to the above
stated rule where extraordinary circumstances are involved.
In the matter of specific performance of a contract for the sale of land,
it was held in the case of Ogletree v. Ingram & LeGrand Lumber Co. 8
that while such a contract, which is in writing, is certain and fair, for
an adequate consideration, and capable of being performed, may be
enforced by specific performance, such remedy is not one which either
party may demand as a matter of absolute right. Specific performance will
not be granted unless the result would be strictly equitable and just, and
mere inadecuacy in price would be sufficient to justify a court in refusing
specific performance. For this reason, a petition which does not allege
the value of the land involved, or set out facts from which the same may
be ascertained, does not sufficiently allege that the contract sued upon
was fair and just, and such petition is subject to general duemurrer in so
far as any prayer for specific performance is involved.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

207 Ga. 636, 63 S.E.2d 655 (1951).
207 Ga. 550.63 S.E.2d 407 (1951).
Citing GA. CODE § 55-303 (1933).
Citing GA. CODE § 55-106 (1933).
207 Ga. 333, 61 S.E.2d 480 (1950).
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Specific performance being an equitable remedy is naturally subject
to those defenses which are peculiar to equity, as for instance, laches. As
was held in the case of Hagler v. Hagler" which was an action for specific
performance to compel an adoption, where petitioners waited until they
were thirty and thirty-five years old, respectively, before bringing an
action against the personal representative of their prospective foster
father to compel the performance of an alleged adoption contract with
the deceased, such alleged contract having been entered into during their
minority, such suit was barred by laches, and the petition was properly
dismissed on general demurrer.
In the case of Hulgan v. Gledhill" the petitioner alleged that the defenant contracted to build a house for him at a cost of "approximately
$2,0o0." The petition neither alleged nor did the evidence show the
.value of the land, or the house, and there was no evidence as to the type
of house which the defendant was to construct nor any other fact from
which an inference might be drawn by a jury as to the value of the property. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was not sufficient to sup.port a verdict and decree of specific performance and that a nonsuit was
proper; holding, "To justify the specific execution of a parol agreement,
its terms and conditions should be precisely stated. If the contract which
is sought to be performed, is vague and uncertain, or the evidence does
not support it, equity will not enforce it."
DOMESTIC RELATIONS

In view of the fact that most of the decisions during the past year
on the subject of domestic relations were propositioned upon substantive
law, and since this is covered in another part of this Survey, the writers
will not attempt to digest any of the recent cases on this topic.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

The subject of declaratory judgments was 'again battered about with
the decisions of our appellate courts still restricting its use and failing
to provide for the obvious legislative intent of the declaratory judgment
law. As for instance, in the case of City of Summerville v. Sellars,9 where
in a petition for a declaratory judgment the plaintiff requested an adjudication of his rights under an alleged contract with the defendants. The
only question which arose is whether the defendant was liable to the
plaintiff for breach of contract. The court held that under the decisions
of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the action did not lie
because there was no reason why a simple action for breach of contract
would not give full and complete relief. The Court of Appeals, adhering
strictly to the previous doctrine as laid down in Mayor of Athens v.
Gerdine,q2 states, "the mere existence of a controversy does not give rise
to an action for a declaratory judgment. While likewise the mere existence
89.
90.
91.
92.

207 Ga. 239, 60 S.E.2d 378
207 Ga. 349, 61 S.E.2d 473
82 Ga. App. 361, 61 S.E.2d
202 Ga. 197, 42 S.E.2d 567

(1950).
(1950).
160 (1950).
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.of another remedy will not necessarily preclude the action, the petition
.inthis case lacks the essential ingredient of an alleged necessity for an
adjudication to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and in:security with respect to future conduct."
'Inthe case of Bond v. Ray, 3 the Supreme Court again pointed out that
under the Georgia statute, an action for declratory judgment is not
equitble per se. After reviewing the pleadings in the Bond case, the court
determined that the action was one at law rather than one in equity, and
trnsferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
The question of venue in a declaratory judgment action is determined
by the same principles applicable to other actions at law and in equity.
Therefore, although petition sought damages for trespass and injuction,
where it also sought a declaratory judgment to establish title to certain
land in the plaintiff, the action was properly brought in the county where
the land lay. 4
COURT OF ORDINARY

An appeal to the superior court from that of the court of ordinary is
:strictly a de novo investigation, and the judgment rendered by the superior
court if supported by evidence is valid, even though contrary to that in the
court of ordinary, which was also supported by evidence.
NONSUIT

The basic precepts with reference to nonsuit are well settled and time
honored. It would perhaps be wise, however, to set down certain of
these fundamental rules for the edification of the novice and as a review
for the older practitioner. The case of Padgett v. Williams" laid down
three fundamentals of the law of nonsuit. ( i) It is error to grant a nonsuit where the evidence would authorize recovery for the plaintiff in any
amount. (2) In passing on the question of a nonsuit the evidence must
be taken most strongly in favor of the plaintiff. (3) A motion to nonsuit is in the nature of a general demurrer to the evidence and does not
go to the pleadings, the only question being whether the evidence proves
the case as laid.
In spite of the many rulings of our appellate courts to the effect that
rulings upon motions for nonsuit should never be made grounds for a
motion for a new trial, there is apparently a temptation to seek a review
,on such rulings' in this manner. It is again distinctly stated in the case of
Bland v. Davison-Paxon Co. " that the overruling of a motion for a nonsuit
cannot be reviewed by motion for new trial, but should be made the subject of direct exceptions.
93. 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951).
94.
95.
'96.
97.
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Roe v. Pitts, 82 Ga.
82 Ga. App. 509, 61
83 Ga. App. 468, 64
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VERDICT AND JUDGMENT

The majority of questions relating to verdicts, decided by the appellate
courts during the past year, dealt with directed verdicts. While the principies set forth in most of the cases are well established, they probably
justify some comment because of the fact that they are constantly being
carried to our appellate courts for adjudication.
It was again pointed out that it is never error to refuse to direct a verdict;S and especially where the evidence shows that there was an issue
of fact." Also, that the general grounds are not sufficient to question the
propriety of directing a verdict."'
As to an instance where opposite parties at a trial each moved for
directed verdicts in their favor, it was held in Ennis v. Ennis,' that such
acts, wtihout more, do not amount to a consent that the case should be disposed of by the direction of a verdict for one side or the other, or preclude the aggrieved parties from bringing writs of error to a judgment
overruling their motions for a new trial on the general grounds, through
which the verdict as a whole is sought to be reached because the evidence
demanded a contrary finding as to a part thereof.
In reversing the direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff becausethe evidence did not demand such direction, the Supreme Court, in the
case of Davis v. Jight,12 pointed out several instances where the direction
of verdicts is proper. It was held that under the Code, ' that where
there is no conflict in the evidence, and that introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences thereform, shall demand a particular verdict, the court may direct the jury to find for the party entitled thereto.
Stating this rule differently, it was said that it is error to direct a verdict, except where there is no conflict in the evidance as to the material
facts, and the evidence introduced together with all reasonable deductions
or inferences therefrom demands a particular verict. Also, that a verdict should not be directed unless there is no issue of fact, or unless the
proved facts, viewed from every possbile legal point of view, can sustain no
other findina than that directed.
It was held in the case of Hawkins v. Benton Rapid Express, Inc."'
that where separate and distinct acts of negligence on the part of different defendants allegedly concurred to cause the iniuries complained of,
the jury may by its verdict hold the one and acouit the others. Where the
iury returns a verdict in favor of all the defendants, which verdict is
illegal as a matter of law as to one of them who was in default at the
time of the trial, the trial court may grant a motion for a new trial as to
such defendant and refuse it to the others, thus segregatini, that part of
the judgment which was legal from that part which was illegal.
98. Goss v. State, 82 Ga. App. 533, 61 S.E.2d 570 (1950).
99. Paris v. Paris. 207 Ga. 341, 61 S.E.2d 491 (1950).
100. Lanoford v. Edmondson. 82 Go. App. 494, 61 S.E.2d 558 (1950): Conley v. Brophy,
207 Ga. 30, 60 S.E.2d 122 (1950).
101. 207 Ga. 665,63 S.E.2d 887 (1951).
102. 207 Ga. 590, 63 S.E.2d 405 (1951).
103. Section 110-104 (1933).
104. 82 Ga. App. 819, 62 S.E.2d 612 (1950).
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The well-established principle that a judgment against a party where
there has been no valid service upon him, and no waiver of service, is
void, was again propounded in the case of Foster v. Foster."5 The court
continued its discussion with the statement that Code Section 3-702, which
provides that actions to set aside judgments should be brought within three
years from the rendition of such judgments, is not applicable where the
attack is made upon a judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of
jurisdiction of a party to such judgment. The same case further held that
a party against whom a void judgment exists in the court of ordinary
moy bring an equitable petition to have such judgment canceled and set
aside, without first moving to have such judgment canceled in the court
of ordinary.
APPEALS

In adjudicating matters of appellate procedure and practice, the courts
have, during the period under survey, adhered rather closely to the established rules. Their interpretation of the revised rules of 1946.. have
been rather consistent. Most of the new problems presented by the revision of these rules have been decided and settled. However, several of
the Rules of the Court of Appeals have been amended and these changes
will be discussed. 1°7
Rule I2,' °' relating to the preparation of bills of exceptions and transcripts, was amended by adding the requirement that parties plaintiff
in error and defendant in error shall be designated as usch by name in the
bill of exceptions.
Rule 16,1" relating to preparation of briefs, was deleted in its entirety and the following substituted in lieu thereof:
Rule 16. Briefs, how prepared. Briefs must be plainly written or printed upon
white paper, not so thin as to be transparent, with ample spacing between the
lines. Single-spaced typewritten matter is prohibited. Writing with Den or
typewriter must be on only one side of each sheet, and a margin of at least
one and one half inches shall be left at the top and on left side of each page.
Citations of authority shall be by name of case as well as by volume and page
of report. Each copy of brief shall be backed with the number and name of the
case so endorsed therein as to be visible when the brief is folded.
Rule 21," ' relating to

the service of all briefs and all motions, was
amended bv providing that no brief received after the time specified,'
shall be filed except on application and permission by the court.
Rule 22,112 relating to the filing of briefs and paying of costs, was
amended by changing the requirement prohibiting the clerk from "receiv105. 207 Ga. 519,63 S.E.2d 318 (1951).
106. Ga. Laws 1946, p. 726.
107. These amendments were adopted December 19, 1950, and published in 82 Ga. App.
903.
108.

GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3612 (Supp. 1947).

109.
110.

GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3616 (Supp. 1947).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3621 (Supp. 1947), as amended, 80 Ga. App. 888 (April 12,
1950).
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ing" the brief of the counsel for the plaintiff in error until all costs are
paid or pauper's affidavit filed, to the requirement that the clerk is prohibited from "filing" the brief until all costs are paid or pauper's affidavit
filed.
Rule 43,3 relating to motions for rehearings, was amended by adding
the following:
Motions nust he plainly written or printed upon white paper, not so thin as
to be transparent, with ample spacing between the lines. Single spaced typewritten matter is prohibited. Writing with pen or typewriter miust be oil only
one side of each sheet, and a margin of at least one and one-half incches shall
be left at the top and on left side of each page. If authority is cited in the motion,
it shall be by name of case as well as by volume and page of report.

On January IO, I95i, the Court of Appeals adopted a new Rule 51,14
in regard to supersedeas, which reads as follows:
Rule 51. Supersedeas. Where the trial judge has refused a supersedeas, and
where under the facts of the case the question raised by the writ of error would
become moot unless the judgment should he superseded, as where, for example, a sale or other act sought to he enjoined is about to take place pending the writ of error, the Court of Appeals may in its discretion grant a supersedeas or direct the trial judge to do so, for the purpose of preserving jurisdiction of the writ or error. In such case, it should be made to appear that application for supersedeas was duly presented to the trial judge and refused
by him. The application to this court should further show that copy thereof
has been served on respondent or his attorney, or that such service has been
waived; but the court may act on ex parte application, if the exigencies of the
case so require.
Even though Rule 12 of the Court of Appeals" 5 was amended

December I9, I95O, by inserting the requirement that parties plaintiff in error
and defendant in error shall be designated as such by name in the bill
of exceptions, it was held in the case of Welch v. Halev, 1 that the failure
in a bill of exceptions to expressly designate the defendant in error eo
nomine will not work a dismissal where the bill of exceptions affirmatively
and unequivocally shows on its face who is such defendant in error.
Several cases were decided during the period of this survey on the
question of who should be made parties on aupeal. We have chosen two
cases as being illustrative of the law. The first, Salter v. Heys,"' laid
down the principle that although a person may be interested in the subject matter of a suit in the trial court, which renders a judgment favorable
to his interest, he is not a necessary party defendant in a writ of error to the
Supreme Court which assigns error on such judgment, where such interested person was not a party to the suit in the trial court at the time the
judgzment complained of was rendered.
The second was the extremely intertesting case of Ilford v. State, 11
which arose under condemnation proceedings against an automobile allegedly being used for the transportation of liquors in volation of law. No
parties were named in the bill of exceptions but the solicitor of the city
,court in which the case was tried acknowledged service of a copy of the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3643 (Supp. 1947).
82 Ga. App. 903 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 903, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3612 (Supp. 1947). See Note 105 s-upra.
83 Ga. Anp. 492, 64 S.E.2d 364 (1951).
207 Ga. 591, 63 S.E.2d 376 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 79, 60 S.E.2d 431 (1950).
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same. This was the only indication in the record of service or acknowledgment of service of the bill of exceptions. The Court of Appeals held that
the acknowledgment of service by the solicitor was for the State, which
was only a formal or technical party to the proceeding, but the officers
making the seizure were necessary parties in the appellate court, they having an interest in the proceeds to be derived from the sale of the vehicle
as provided in Code Section 58-207 (as amended)."' Therefore, being
interested in sustaining the judgment of the lower court, and under the
provisions of Code Section 6-916, a copy of the bill of exceptions should
have been served on each of the officers having an interest in the proceeds to be derived from the sale of the vehicle, or his attorney, or an
acknowledgment of service taken and the record having shown only an
acknowledgment of service taken for the State, the Court of Appeals was
without jurisdiction to entertain the writ of error and the same was dismissed.
The question of what causes are reviewable in our appellate courts continues to be troublesome, as for example, in the case of Farrarv. Ainsworth1' where a bill of exceptions assigned error only on an order overruling exceptions to an auditor's report, this ordinarily not being a final
judgment, nevertheless, where the court went further and made the auditor's report the judgment of the court, thus adjudicating the rights of
the parties on the merits, such order was a final judgment, and not a mere
overruling of exceptions of the report.
It was decided in the case of Shropshire v. Broome"' that a judgment
overruling demurrers to a caveat to a will offered for probate in solemn
form, where the record failed to disclose an order either admitting or
denying probate, was not a final judgment and not capable of review, and
consequently the write of error was dismissed.
The necessity for a ruling being controlling in a case was again emphasized in the case of Nail v. Nail."' There the verdict and final judgment were not necessarily controlled bv an order refusing to allow two
proffered amendments to the petition. The amendments had been offered
for the purpose of alleging the source of plaintiff's title to the land in controversy and the pleaded facts were insufficient to show title, either legal or
equitable. The court held that in order to be emoowered to pass upon an assignment of error, where there has been a verdict and no motion for a new
trial, as in this case, the antecedent ruling complained of, under the terms
of Code Section 6-804, must have been one which necessarily controlled
the verdict, judgment, or decree.
An exception to a general rule was discussed in Gibson v. Wood,"' involving custody of a child. The court first set out Code Section 30-127,
which declares: "In all cases of divorce granted, the party not in default
shall be entitled to the custody of the minor children of the marriage.
The court, however, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may look into
all the circumstances, and, after hearing both parties, make a different
119.
120.
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122.
123.
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disposition of the children. . ." Previous cases on this subject took the
view that the above quoted Code Section contemplated that the judge,
and not the jury, should dispose of the children of the marriage. If the
court should award the custody to the mother, and the father desires to
except to the decree in this particular, error should be assigned upon the
decree. It is not a ground for new trial. In the case under discusion, the
court pointed out that the above requirment for a direct bill of exceptions
and not a motion for a new trial, in the event a losing party desires to except to a judgment awarding the custody of children, constitutes an exception to the general rule that, "where the issues of a case are submitted
to the judge, without the intervention of a jury, for his decision upon all
matters of fact and of law, and he renders a judgment therein in term
time, the losing party may review the judgment either by a direct bill of
exceptions or by a motion for a new trial."
The usual procedure where it appears that an appellate court is without
jurisdiction to entertain a bill of exceptions is by a motion to dismiss the
writ of error by the defendant in error. However, where no such motion
is made the appellate court will properly dismiss the writ of error on its
own motion."'
In assigning error, it was held in the case of Arnold v. Selman". that
an assignment of error to the direction of a verdict, assigning "the same
as error upon the ground that said directing a verdict was contrary to
law" is a sufficient assignment of error to raise the question whether
the evidence demanded the verdict directed and a bill of exceptions based
on such assignment is proper.
There has been some further adjudication with reference to the construction of the Act of 1947, 8" providing that a brief of evidence need
not be filed with a motion for new trial (and, by inference, with the record
on appeal), where evidence is not essential to an adjudication of the case.
It was held by the Court of Appeals in JJ/hitner v. Whitner21' that regardless of this Code Section, an appellate court could not, in the absence
of a brief of the evidence, consider rulings on a special demurrer, where
the bill of exceptions also assigned error on the overruling of a motion
for a new trial, since the court could not, in such case, determine whether
the rulings on the demurrer actually constituted harmful error. Applying
the above rule, the Court of Appeals dismissed the writ of error on motion.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, ' 8 in reversing the JJhitner case, held
that the Court of Appeals properly determined that a brief of the evidence
was necessary for a consideration of the writ of error assigning error on exceptions pendente lite'to an order overruling special demurrers of the plaintiff to the defendant's amendment of her plea and answer filed at the conclusion of the evidence, and to an order dismissing the plaintiff's motion for
a new trial based on the general grounds, but the Court of Appeals should
have affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and not dismissed the writ of
124. Shropshire v. Broome, 207 Ga. 313. 61 S.E.2d 284 (1950).
125. 83 Ga. App. 150. 62 S.E.2d 919 (1951). See also Arnold v. Selman, 83 Ga. App.
145, 62 S.E.2d 915 (1951).
126. Ga. Laws 1947, p. 298. GA. CODE ANN. § 70-301.1 (Supp. 1947).
127. 80 Ga. App. 831, 57 S.E.2d 458 (1950).
128. Whitner v. Whitner, 207 Ga. 97, 60 S.E.2d 464 (1950).
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error on motion. The Supreme Court further held that at the time of
the passage of the Act of I947,"' there was a well-established rule that,
where an appellate court, in review of a judgment denying a motion for
a new trial, is called upon to pass on exceptions pendente lite complaining
of the overruling of special demurrers, it may look to the evidence in the
record to determine (a) whether or not any harm resulted to the complainant by reason of the ruling, and (b) whether the evidence demanded the
verdict rendered; and if the ruling, though erroneous, was harmless, the
judgment on demurrer would not be reversed. That the Act of 194713
in no wise attempted to limit the right of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals to examine and determine whether the record contains
all the factual information that is necessary for a correct determination of
the errors complained of; but that the act expressly provides that, where
,no evidence is in the record, the court shall not be required to pass upon
any assignments of error contained in the bill of exceptions which require
a consideration of the evidence. That where a brief of the evidence is
necessary for the appellate court to consider a cause, the proper disposition of the case under such circumstances is to affirm the judgment of
the trial court, and not to dismiss the writ of error.
It should be noted that since Ga. Code Ann. Section 70-301.1, providing that a brief of evidence need not be filed with a motion for a new trial
where evidence is not essential to the case, is being so strictly construed by
our appellate courts, it should not be depended upon except in those cases
where the attorney is absolutely certain that the evidence is not necessary
in any way to the adjudication of his case.
Under Rule 211'1 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals, the brief of
counsel for the plaintiff in error must be filed with the clerk of that
court within fifteen days after the docketing of the case, and a party must
obtain the permission of the court to file additional or supplemental briefs
after the time fixed by the rule for filing briefs has passed. A brief which
is filed within the time provided by the above rule, and argues only that
the verdict is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it,
and that the verdict is herefore contrary to law and principles of justice
and equity, will be treated as abandoning all other assignments of error.
Applving the above principles, the Court of Appeals in the case of
Vandiver v. Garmon,' held that where the case was heard in that court
on July 3, 195o, and was submitted on briefs without oral arguments and
the original brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error was filed on June 21,
195o, containing only general grounds, and not arguing or insisting upon
-special grounds of the motion for new trial, such grounds would be
treated as having been abandoned on that date. That the subsequent submission some two months later, without having obtained prior approval
of the court, of a supplemental brief on behalf of the plaintiff in error,
seeking therein to argue and discuss the special grounds of the motion for
new trial, would not be effective to cure the prior abandonment of the
129. See note 126 supra.
130. Ibid. See Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949).
131.
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special grounds, and under such circumstances the court would not consider such abandoned grounds of the motion for new trial or the argument of the supplemental brief.
Even though the Act of I946... was an apparent attempt to liberalize
to some extent the rules of construction of the trial judge's certification
to the bill of exceptions, our appellate courts continue to hold that where
the trial judge omits to certify that the bill of exceptions is true, the
appellate courts have no jurisdiction, and the bill of exceptions must be
dismissed. Thus, in Beasley v. Georgia Power Co., 1" the Supreme Court
held that where the judge of a trial court certified that the bill of exceptions
specified all of the record material to a clear understanding of the errors
complained of, and ordered the clerk to make out a complete copy of
the parts of the record specified and certify the same as such, but omitted
any verification of the truthfulness of the recitals contained in the bill
of exceptions, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to entertain such
bill of exceptions, and a motion to dismiss would prevail. The Act of
I946, " mentioned above, repealed Code Section 6-8o8, which made it the
duty of the judge to whom any bill of exceptions was presented to see that
the certificate was in legal form before signing the same, and amended
Code Section 6-8o6, which gives the form of the certificate, the duty of
the judge before signing, and the effect of the signing. The present Code
Section 6-8o6, after setting out the form of the certificate, states, " . . .
It shall be the duty of the judge, to whom any bill of exceptions shall be
presented, to see that the certificate is in legal form before signing the same.
Whenever a judge shall attach his signature to a certificate where the
language of the certificate is such as to indicate the intention of the judge.
to verify the truthfulness of the recitals therein contained, his signature
shall be construed as a verification of the bill of exceptions and the contents
thereof unless by note thereto or modification thereof over his signature
the contrary affirmatively appears." (Italics supplied.) Attention should
be called to the fact that the first sentence of the part of Code Section
6-8o6 quoted above is the same as the first part of Code Section 6-8o8
prior to its repeal by the 1946 act. Repealed Code Section 6-8oS is as
follows: "It shall be the duty of the judge, to whom any bill of exceptions
is presented, to see that the certificate is in legal form before signing the
same; and no failure of any judge to discharge his duty in this respect
shall prejudice the rights of the parties by dismissal or otherwise." In
construing Code Section 6-8o6, as amended by the Act of 1946, the
language of the Supreme Court is as follows: "The form of the certificate
to be signed by the judge to the bill of exceptions is not changed by this
amendment. While there is language in the latter part of the section which
indicates that the judge's certificate may vary from the form prescribed,
the judge is still required to verify the truthfulness of the recitals in the
bill of exceptions in order that the appellate court may have jurisdiction.
The new provision of the rule, that the judge's signature 'shall be construed as a verification of the bill of exceptions and the contents thereof
133. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 726, 732, GA. CODE ANN. § 6-806 (Supp. 1947).
134. 207 Ga. 188, 60 S.E.2d 363 (1950).
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unless by note thereto or modification thereof over his signature the contrary affirmatively appears,' applies only 'where the language of the certificate is such as to indicate the intention of the judge to verify the truthfulness of the recitals' contained in the bill of exceptions. The mere absence
of any note to the contrary could not indicate the intention of the judge
to verify the truthfulness of the recitals in the bill of exceptions, where:
no verification is made. The certification that the bill of exceptions specifies
all of the record material to a clear understanding of the errors complained
of does not amount to a certification of the bill of exceptions as true."
The doubt which apparently existed in the minds of a great many members of the Bar concerning the double service of a bill of exceptions, or the
waiver of such (one, service or waiver thereof prior to the tendering of
the same to the trial judge for certification, and the other, service or
waiver after such certification), seems to have been resolved by the Supreme Court decision in McGreggor v. W. L. Florence Const. Co.'36 In
that case it is stated: "While a compliance with the rule of practice and
procedure of I946" ' . . . requiring reasonable notice to the defendant in
error or his counsel of the intention to present a bill of exceptions to the
trial judge for certification, so that the opposite party may be heard on the
question as to whether or not the proposed bill of exceptions is correct and
complete, does not dispense with the necessity of serving the defendant in
error with a copy of the bill of exceptions after it is certified, as required by
Code Section 6-91 i-where there is no acknowledgment or waiver of service,"' . . . such service may be waived, for, what is commonly referred to as
the 'Bleckley Act','" . . . provides, 'Where counsel shall acknowledge service
upon a bill of exceptions, such acknowledgment shall be held to be a complete waiver of all defects in the service which the counsel signing it is legally competent to waive, whether such signing shall be done before or after
the signing the writ of error, unless counsel in the entry of acknowledgment shall distinctly and specifically state that it is not to be construed as
waiving some particular defect then pointed out by him. If such acknowledgment of service shall be properly entitled in the cause, it need not be
physically attached to the bill of exceptions.' Where, as in this case,
counsel for the defendant in error, prior to the-presentation or certification
of the bill of exceptions, sign an acknowledgment and waiver as follows:
'Undersigned approve the foregoing bill of exceptions as correct and complete as to the averments of fact therein contained, waive the privilege
of notice under rule number 7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure
for appeal or review, acknowledge due, timely, and legal service of the
within bill of exceptions, have received copy, and waive all other and
further notice or service in the premises as provided by Georgia Laws 191 1,
at pages 149 to I5I, inclusively,' this constitutes an express waiver of
service of the bill of exceptions as required by Code Section 6-911. The
136. 208 Ga. 176, 65 S.E.2d 809 (1951). See also, Godwin v. Atlantic Steel Co., 82
Ga. App. 391, 61 S.E.2d 155 (1950); Outlaw v. Premium Dist. Co., 83 Ga. App.
198, 63 S.E.2d 260 (1951) ; Parker v. Parker, 208 Ga. 190, 65 S.E.2d 794 (1951).
137. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 726, 735, GA. CODE ANN., §§ 6-908.1, 6-909 (Supp. 1947).
138. Mauldin v. Mauldin, 203 Ga. 123, 45 S.E.2d 818 (1947); West Lumber Co. v.
Harris, 204 Ga. 343, 50 S.E.2d 15 (1948) ; Henry v. Gillis, 204 Ga. 397, 50 S.E.2d
73 (1948) ; Irwin v. LeCraw, 206 Ga. 702, 58 S.E.2d 383 (1950).
139. Ga. Laws 1911, p. 149, GA. CODE§ 6-912 (1933).
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motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions for want of service thereof after
it was signed, is, because of such waiver, without

merit.

The question of the use of the writ of mandamus to force a trial judge
to certify a bill of exceptions was again raised in the case of McLendon v.
Anderson,"' where the Supreme Court decided that it is mandatory, irrespective of the merits of the case, that the trial judge certify a bill of
exceptionsin a criminal case, if it be the first bill of exceptions after verdict,
and upon his refusal the Supreme Court will require him to do so. However,
the court went on to point out that after the conviction has once been
reviewed on a bill of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for new trial,
and was affirmed, it is not required that the trial judge certify a bill of
exceptions complaining of rulings on motions unless the exception is meritorious and the appellate court should look into the merits of the case
before ordering the trial judge to so certify.
An interesting statement regarding supersedeas was made in imerican
2
Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Ellison,'1
wherein the court, quoting from
the old decision in the case of Jordan v. Jordan,"" held that where a case is
appealed and the excepting party does not do what is necessary to make
his bill of exceptions operate as a supersedeas, the other party may go on
with the case or, not, at his pleasure. If he chooses to go on, he must do
so at his peril. Taking the chance of an affirmance, he must run the risk of a
reversal; and as by an affirmance he would gain all the ground he passes
over, so by a reversal he must lose it all.
The hoary adage that assignments of error upon constitutional questions which are raised for the first time in the bill of exceptions cannot be
considered by the appellate court, was again laid down by the decision in
the case ofiken v. Richardson.'" It would seem to be apparent that this
should require no further discussion.
After an extensive review of the statutes, rules of court, and decisions

of the past year on the subject of appellate procedure, it is again brought
home forcefully that appellate procedure in Georgia, although never
being over simple, has now become overly complicated. Time and time
again, attempts have been made by our legislatures and our courts to
clarify this subject, but with each such attempt, rather than bringin forward a simplification, from a pratical point of view, there has been en-

gineered another burden to be placed on the already heavily laden shoulders
of the unhappy litigant.
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142. 82 Ga. App. 712, 62 S.E.2d 656 (1950). However, see Rule 51 of the Court of
Appeals, adopted January 10, 1951.
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